US involvement in Iran, Iraq and the Gulf War
The Iranian Revolution and Hostage Crisis, 1979
Since 1953, the USA had strongly supported the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, whose regime received American military and financial backing in exchange for oil supplies and a strategic anti-communist alliance. Many Iranians resented what they saw as American interference in their country’s affairs. In January 1979, mass protests and a revolution drove the Shah into exile. The revolution was led by Ayatollah Khomeini, a Shia cleric who established an Islamic Republic.
On 4 November 1979, Iranian students stormed the US Embassy in Tehran and took 52 American diplomats hostage. The Tehran hostage crisis lasted 444 days and proved deeply damaging to President Carter’s presidency. A military rescue attempt, Operation Eagle Claw (April 1980), failed catastrophically when helicopters crashed in the Iranian desert. The hostages were only released on 20 January 1981 — the day Ronald Reagan was inaugurated as president.
The Iranian Revolution (January 1979) replaced the US-backed Shah with Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic Republic. The Tehran hostage crisis began on 4 November 1979 when 52 US diplomats were seized; it lasted 444 days and ended on 20 January 1981 — the day Reagan took office. It severely damaged Carter’s re-election prospects.
The Iran-Iraq War and US Policy, 1980–1988
In September 1980, Iraq’s president, Saddam Hussein, ordered an invasion of revolutionary Iran, hoping to exploit the chaos of the revolution and seize the oil-rich Khuzestan region. The USA, alarmed by the Islamic Republic’s hostility, provided significant support to Iraq during the war — including intelligence, agricultural credits, and dual-use technology that could be used for weapons development. The war lasted eight years and cost approximately 500,000 to 1 million lives before ending inconclusively in August 1988.
The United States’ support for Iraq during this war was later cited as a damaging inconsistency in American foreign policy. By backing Saddam Hussein’s regime, the USA helped build up the very military machine that would threaten regional stability less than two years after the war ended. The USS Stark incident of May 1987 — in which an Iraqi aircraft fired missiles at an American frigate, killing 37 sailors — was treated with restraint by the Reagan administration, illustrating how strongly the USA prioritised containing Iran over confronting Iraq. This context made it deeply embarrassing when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, forcing the USA to mobilise against a regime it had recently been supporting.
Having been armed and supported by the USA during the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam Hussein turned aggressively westward. On 2 August 1990, Iraqi forces invaded neighbouring Kuwait, a small but oil-rich emirate. Saddam claimed Kuwait as historically part of Iraq and resented Kuwait’s alleged overproduction of oil that was depressing prices. The international community, including the Arab League, condemned the invasion. The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 678 in November 1990, authorising the use of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait if it had not withdrawn by 15 January 1991.
Operation Desert Storm, 1991
Under President George H. W. Bush, the USA assembled a coalition of 35 nations — including Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria — to liberate Kuwait. This diplomatic achievement was seen as one of Bush’s greatest successes. Operation Desert Storm began on 17 January 1991 with an intensive air campaign that degraded Iraqi military infrastructure. The ground offensive began on 24 February 1991 and lasted just 100 hours before Kuwait was liberated. Iraqi forces suffered heavy casualties; Kuwait was freed with relatively low coalition losses.
Operation Desert Storm (January–February 1991) combined an intensive six-week air campaign with a ground war that lasted just 100 hours. The coalition of 35 nations, assembled by President Bush, liberated Kuwait. Bush chose not to advance to Baghdad and remove Saddam Hussein, believing it would destabilise the region and break up the coalition.
Bush’s decision to end the war at Kuwait’s liberation rather than marching on Baghdad was controversial. Supporters argued it was consistent with the UN mandate (which authorised expelling Iraq from Kuwait, not regime change) and with preserving the Arab coalition. Critics argued it left Saddam Hussein in power and required the USA to maintain a large military presence in Saudi Arabia — which became a grievance cited by Osama bin Laden and contributed to later conflict. The unresolved question of Iraq would dominate US foreign policy for the following decade.