The Depression and the rise of the Nazis 1929-1933
From Depression to Hitler’s Appointment
The Wall Street Crash of October 1929 transformed German politics with terrifying speed. American banks recalled their loans, the economic recovery built on the Dawes Plan instantly collapsed, and unemployment rocketed. By 1932 over six million Germans were out of work — nearly a third of the workforce. Hunger, despair and political radicalisation followed.
The crisis proved fatal for the republic because the political system could not cope. The two parties most committed to democracy — the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Catholic Centre Party — could not agree on how to fund unemployment benefits. In March 1930 the Grand Coalition collapsed. From that moment Germany was governed not by parliamentary majority but by presidential decree under Article 48.
Presidential Cabinets and the End of Parliamentary Government
Heinrich Brüning became Chancellor in March 1930 with no majority in the Reichstag. He governed by presidential decree, cutting public spending in response to the Depression — a policy that deepened the economic crisis and intensified popular suffering. When the Reichstag rejected his budget in September 1930, Brüning called elections. The result was catastrophic: the NSDAP surged from 12 seats to 107, winning 18.3% of the vote. The Nazi party had become a mass movement overnight.
NSDAP Reichstag election results: September 1930 — 18.3%; July 1932 — 37.3% (largest party); November 1932 — 33.1% (falling). Hitler was appointed Chancellor on 30 January 1933 despite the November decline.
Why Did People Vote Nazi?
Nazi electoral success was multi-causal and must not be reduced to a single factor. The economic crisis was central: unemployment destroyed living standards, savings were wiped out, and middle-class Germans who had survived hyperinflation now faced ruin again. The Nazis offered compelling scapegoats — Jews, Marxists, the “November criminals” blamed for the Versailles settlement — and a vision of national revival under a strong leader.
Nazi propaganda, masterminded by Joseph Goebbels, was sophisticated. The party used modern technology — aircraft, cinema, radio — to project Hitler as a messianic saviour above party politics. Different messages were crafted for different audiences: farmers heard about agricultural protection, the middle class about order and anti-communism, young people about national renewal and adventure.
The German Communist Party (KPD) also grew during the Depression, winning 17% in November 1932. But the KPD and SPD were bitterly divided, following Moscow’s Comintern line that social democrats were “social fascists” — enemies as dangerous as the Nazis. This split on the left prevented any united anti-Nazi front, allowing Hitler to exploit the space between them.
The KPD’s growth also terrified Germany’s conservative elite — industrialists, landowners, army officers and politicians like Franz von Papen — who convinced themselves they could use Hitler as a weapon against communism and then control him. This catastrophic miscalculation paved the way for Hitler’s appointment.
Elite Intrigue and the Path to Power
After Brüning’s dismissal in May 1932, two more chancellors followed in rapid succession. Franz von Papen ruled by decree from June to December 1932, and Kurt von Schleicher briefly replaced him in December. Neither could build a majority. Both elections in 1932 produced an ungovernable Reichstag dominated by Nazis and Communists — parties committed to destroying the republic.
In November 1932 the NSDAP vote actually fell from 37.3% to 33.1%, suggesting the Nazi surge might be receding. The party was running short of funds. But von Papen struck a secret deal: he persuaded the ageing President Hindenburg to appoint Hitler as Chancellor on 30 January 1933, with conservatives holding most cabinet seats. Von Papen boasted that he had “hired” Hitler. Within weeks he would understand his error.
Hitler’s rise was caused by multiple intersecting factors: the Depression (economic), the failure of parliamentary government (political), the divided left (party politics), Nazi propaganda (movement strength), and elite miscalculation by Hindenburg and von Papen (individual decisions).
Historians caution against reading backward from the Holocaust. Germans who voted Nazi in 1930 or 1932 were expressing anger at economic catastrophe and the failure of Weimar democracy. The worst of Nazi policy — the systematic murder of Jews, the death camps — was not yet visible in 1932. People did not vote for the Holocaust; they voted against the depression, communism and national humiliation. The Nazi propaganda message in elections emphasised jobs, order and national renewal, not genocide.
This does not excuse Nazi voters or diminish the crimes that followed. It is, however, necessary for accurate historical analysis — and for understanding how a democratic system can produce anti-democratic outcomes.