Cuito Cuanavale, de Klerk and the negotiation begins
South Africa’s War in Angola
From the mid-1970s, South Africa’s Defence Force (SADF) was involved in the Angolan civil war, supporting UNITA rebels against the MPLA government (which was backed by Cuba and the Soviet Union). The apartheid government justified this as part of its “total strategy” to prevent a communist-aligned state on its border. MK maintained training camps in Angola, making the conflict directly connected to the anti-apartheid struggle.
In 1987–88, the largest conventional battles in Africa since the Second World War were fought around the town of Cuito Cuanavale. Cuban forces had deployed in large numbers to reinforce the Angolan army. The outcome was militarily disputed — the SADF prevented the fall of UNITA positions, but Cuban and Angolan forces prevented a decisive SADF victory, and the SADF took significant casualties.
Both sides claimed victory at Cuito Cuanavale. South African sources emphasised that UNITA positions held; Cuban and ANC sources emphasised that the SADF’s advance was stopped and it eventually withdrew. Historians including Stephen Ellis and Piero Gleijeses have offered different assessments. What is clear is that South Africa subsequently agreed to the Tripartite Accord of December 1988, withdrawing from Angola and Namibia.
Divisions Within the National Party
By 1989, P.W. Botha had suffered a stroke and was increasingly isolated within his own party. His refusal to negotiate fundamentally with the ANC was seen by a growing faction within the NP as politically and economically unsustainable. In August 1989, F.W. de Klerk replaced Botha as State President. De Klerk represented a pragmatic wing of the NP that recognised the regime could not survive indefinitely.
De Klerk was not an opponent of apartheid — he had been a loyal NP minister for years. But he understood that the combination of economic crisis, international isolation, internal unrest and the failure of “total strategy” in Angola had left the regime with no viable path forward except negotiation. His decision to go further than any of his predecessors was a calculation of survival, not a conversion to liberalism.
On 2 February 1990, de Klerk delivered a landmark speech to parliament in which he announced the unbanning of the ANC, PAC and South African Communist Party (SACP), the suspension of capital punishment, and the planned release of Nelson Mandela. The speech shocked both supporters and opponents. On 11 February 1990, Mandela walked free from Victor Verster Prison after 27 years of imprisonment.
Mandela’s release was broadcast live around the world. His first public address in Cape Town drew a vast crowd. He affirmed the ANC’s commitment to negotiation but also to the continuation of the armed struggle — MK’s weapons would not be surrendered until a new democratic constitution was in place. This position caused tension with the government but was consistent with the ANC’s negotiating position throughout.
CODESA and the Path to Agreement
In December 1991, negotiations began under the banner CODESA (Convention for a Democratic South Africa). The ANC’s chief negotiator was Cyril Ramaphosa; the government’s was Roelf Meyer. The negotiations were complicated by continuing political violence: in June 1992, the Boipatong massacre killed 45 people and the ANC temporarily withdrew from talks.
In April 1993, the assassination of Chris Hani, leader of the South African Communist Party and a popular ANC figure, by a right-wing Polish immigrant nearly collapsed the entire process. It was Mandela who addressed the nation on television, calling for calm — not de Klerk — demonstrating the degree to which Mandela’s moral authority had surpassed the State President’s.
CODESA produced the Interim Constitution, agreed in November 1993, which set the framework for the April 1994 elections. Despite the Boipatong massacre (June 1992) and the assassination of Chris Hani (April 1993), both of which temporarily halted talks, the negotiations ultimately succeeded.
De Klerk has argued in his memoirs that his decision was motivated by moral conviction as well as pragmatism. Historians are divided: some, like F. van Zyl Slabbert, emphasise the regime’s impossible economic and political position; others give more weight to de Klerk’s personal decision-making. For exam purposes, it is important to present both de Klerk’s stated rationale (principled recognition that apartheid was morally wrong and politically exhausted) and the structural pressures (economic crisis, Angola failure, international isolation) that shaped his choice.