Cold War, IRA and the wars on terror
Britain and the Cold War
After 1945, Britain faced a new kind of threat: not an invading army but the possibility of nuclear annihilation. The Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb in 1949; Britain tested its own in 1952. The deterrence logic of MAD meant that both superpowers maintained arsenals capable of destroying civilisation. Britain, as a NATO member, was committed to American nuclear strategy and hosted US air bases. This made Britain both a participant in nuclear deterrence and a potential target.
The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) was founded in 1958 and quickly became a mass movement. Its annual marches from Aldermaston (the nuclear weapons research centre in Berkshire) to London drew tens of thousands. The philosopher Bertrand Russell and the Canon of St Paul’s, John Collins, were among its founders. CND represented a new form of popular response to warfare — civil society organising against a state military policy rather than supporting it. The movement influenced the Labour Party in the early 1980s, when the party adopted a unilateral disarmament policy before abandoning it after electoral defeat.
CND (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) was founded in 1958 and organised annual marches from Aldermaston to London. It represented mass popular opposition to nuclear weapons policy — one of the first large British peace movements of the post-war period.
The Troubles in Northern Ireland 1969–1998
Northern Ireland’s conflict, known as the Troubles, was rooted in the partition of Ireland in 1921 and the deep divisions between the unionist and nationalist communities. The modern Troubles began in 1969 as civil rights protests against discrimination faced by the nationalist community escalated into violence. British troops were deployed in August 1969, initially welcomed by some in the nationalist community as protection against loyalist attacks. The relationship between the Army and nationalist areas deteriorated rapidly.
Bloody Sunday, 30 January 1972, was a pivotal moment. British paratroopers shot dead thirteen civilian marchers during a civil rights demonstration in Derry/Londonderry. A fourteenth man died later from his injuries. The Widgery Tribunal (1972) largely exonerated the soldiers. Decades later, the Saville Inquiry (published 2010) concluded that the killings were “unjustified and unjustifiable,” that those shot were not posing a threat and that some soldiers had fired on people who were fleeing or helping the wounded. Prime Minister David Cameron apologised on behalf of the British government on the day the Saville Report was published.
The Provisional IRA conducted a sustained bombing and assassination campaign from 1969 to 1994 aimed at ending British rule in Northern Ireland. Attacks included the Birmingham pub bombings (21 November 1974), which killed 21 people, the Brighton hotel bomb (October 1984) that nearly killed Prime Minister Thatcher, and the Canary Wharf bomb (February 1996) that ended a ceasefire. The Guildford pub bombings (October 1974) killed five. Loyalist paramilitary groups also committed killings, predominantly targeting members of the nationalist community.
The Good Friday Agreement (1998), signed by the British and Irish governments and the main Northern Ireland parties, established a power-sharing assembly and a framework for resolving the conflict through democratic means. Key figures included John Hume (SDLP), Gerry Adams (Sinn Féin), David Trimble (Ulster Unionist Party) and Mo Mowlam as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. The Agreement received 71% support in a referendum in Northern Ireland and 94% in the Republic of Ireland. The Troubles are estimated to have killed approximately 3,500 people over thirty years.
The Iraq War 2003
On 15 February 2003, approximately one million people marched through London to oppose the planned invasion of Iraq — one of the largest demonstrations in British history. Despite this, the UK government under Tony Blair joined the US-led coalition that invaded Iraq in March 2003. The stated justification was that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that posed an imminent threat. No such weapons were found.
The Chilcot Inquiry, published in July 2016, was the most comprehensive public examination of the decision to go to war. Sir John Chilcot’s report concluded that the intelligence on Iraqi WMD was presented with more certainty than the evidence warranted; that the decision to invade was made before all peaceful options had been exhausted; that post-war planning was wholly inadequate; and that the legal basis for war was “far from satisfactory.” The report did not use the word “illegal” but concluded that the process for reaching the decision to go to war was flawed. The war divided British political opinion more sharply than any conflict since Suez (1956) and contributed to a lasting decline in public trust in political leaders.
The 7 July 2005 London bombings were carried out by four men who had grown up in Britain and who detonated bombs on three Underground trains and a bus during the morning rush hour, killing 52 people and injuring over 700. It was the deadliest terrorist attack in Britain since Lockerbie (1988). The bombers had been inspired by al-Qaeda ideology and had links to conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The attacks prompted extensive debate about the relationship between British foreign policy (the Iraq War) and domestic terrorist recruitment.
The government’s response included the Counter-Terrorism Acts from 2000 onwards — extended by the Prevention of Terrorism Act (2005), the Terrorism Act (2006) and subsequent legislation. These raised questions about the balance between security and civil liberties: pre-charge detention was extended to 28 days (later reduced), control orders restricted individuals’ movements, and mass surveillance capabilities were expanded. Britain’s deployments in Afghanistan (2001–14) and Iraq (2003–09) cost 456 and 179 British military lives respectively.
The Chilcot Inquiry (published July 2016) concluded that the intelligence on Iraqi WMD was presented with more certainty than the evidence warranted, and that the decision to invade was taken before all peaceful options had been exhausted. Post-war planning was assessed as wholly inadequate.